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POLICING THE HEAD SHOPS: ARE BONGS,
ROACH CLIPS, SYRINGES, AND ...
PROHIBITED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA?
In recent years, the pervasiveness of drug use and abuse has reached
nearly epidemic proportions.' This rapid growth in the number of
habitual drug users had occasioned a concomitant increase in the
manufacture and sales of equipment relating to the consumption of con-
trolled substances.' Responding to increased drug trafficking and pro-
liferation of head shops,' numerous state and local governments have
enacted legislation' designed to curtail the commercial distribution of
drug paraphernalia.'
Such legislation reflects an unmistakable effort to eliminate the
paradox that the paraphernalia industry has created.' Although the ac-
cessories themselves are legal, the controlled substances for which the
accessories are designed are illegal.7 The paraphernalia industry, by
marketing a variety of devices intended for drug-related use, in effect
condones and advocates the use of substances which the government has
' See DuPont, The Marihuana Epidemic, 7 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 8, 9 (March 1980). Re-
cent evidence indicates that there are approximately 16 million regular marijuana users in
the United States. Id
See Rosenthal, The Head Shop Message, 7 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 23, 25 (March 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenthal].
I Id. "Head shops" is a generic term that refers to those business establishments that
specialize in the sales of drug paraphernalia and drug-related devices. Head shops provide
adults and adolescents alike with access to a variety of accessories that facilitate the use
and enjoyment of controlled substances. Id.; see Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein,
497 F. Supp. 289, 290 (D. Del. 1980).
' E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, §§ 4701(13), 4771-4775 (Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§
287A, 297(a) (Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-04 (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE §§ 18.2-248.2,
18.2-255.1 (Supp. 1980); MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT (Draft, Aug. 1979) (proposed
amendment to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act).
5 In recent years, the term "paraphernalia" has acquired customary usage in the ver-
nacular of the drug culture. United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1315 (8th Cir. 1976)
(per curiam); see Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp.
400, 406-07 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Drug paraphernalia denotes those devices which are specially
adapted for use in smoking, preparing, or ingesting marijuana or other controlled
substances. See note 4 supra. Familiar examples of drug paraphernalia include roach clips
(used to hold burning material, such as a marijuana cigarette, which has become too small to
be held in the hand) and bongs (water pipes used to smoke marijuana). See, e.g., MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 287A(a)(12). See generally Christianson, Heroin Paraphernalia: Breakdoum
of a Fix, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 493 (1974).
1 See Bensinger, Proposal for the Control of Drug Paraphernalia, 7 DRUG ENFORCE-
MENT 26, 26 (March 1980). The paraphernalia industry can be characterized as a multimillion
dollar business that glamorizes the use of controlled substances. Id. Flagrant marketing of
drug-related accessories confounds adolescents and openly contradicts society's admonitions
against illegal drugs. Id.
'Id.
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declared illegal and physically harmful.' The paraphernalia restrictions,
therefore, reflect the growing sentiment that sales of drug-related
devices exacerbate the use and abuse of controlled substances.' Legis-
lators and medical experts alike have voiced particular concern about
the effect of controlled substances and paraphernalia sales on the
physical and emotional development of minors." Despite the uncer-
tainties in the statutory language, courts consistently have endorsed
the states' police authority to legislate against marijuana, narcotic
substances, and related paraphernalia.11 Although most of the challenged
enactments have not survived judicial scrutiny because of constitutional
infirmities,12 the courts have indicated that properly drawn statutes can
pass constitutional muster.
13
In response to these various concerns, the challenged statutes and
ordinances prohibit the sale, distribution, and display or advertising of
drug paraphernalia or items which reasonably could be used in the
preparation or administration of controlled substances. 4 Many legis-
lative measures either provide additional penalties for the delivery of
drug-related devices to minors, or are limited solely to offenses regard-
ing sales to minors.15 Other variations of this general regulatory scheme
1Id.
Id; see id. at 27.
10 See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 23-25; notes 14-15 infra. Regular use of marijuana
may prolong the adolescent phase of development and retard the normal maturation pro-
cess. Id. Diminished intellectual performance and learning capabilities may also be at-
tributable to sustained use. Id Other tangible physical effects inclde cardiac and
respiratory impairments, and possible reproductive and endocrine malfunctions. Pollin,
Health Consequences of Marihuana Use, 7 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 4, 6 (March 1980).
,1 See, e.g., Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1980); Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. 400, 410 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Bambu
Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F. Supp. 1297, 1305 (D.N.J. 1979). See generally Hollister & Leigh,
Authority of Municipal Corporations to Abate Unwanted Sounds, 10 Sw. U.L. REV. 267
(1978).
,1 E.g., Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980) (statutory classification of
drug-related devices according to one of five enumerated characteristics impermissibly
vague); Magnani v. City of Ames, No. 80-229-A (S.D. Iowa July 21, 1980) (statutory definition
of drug paraphernalia impermissibly vague); Bambu Sales, Inc. v. Gibson, 474 F. Supp. 1297
(D.N.J. 1979) (ordinance not void for vagueness, but failed to exclude items whose major
uses overwhelmingly lawful).
" See Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26, 28 (8th Cir. 1980); Knoedler v. Roxbury
Township, 485 F. Supp. 990, 994 (D.N.J. 1980).
14 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-04 (Supp. 1979); Ferndale, Mich., Ordinance 692
(Aug. 13, 1979); Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1980); Music Stop, Inc. v. City
of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (sales restrictions); DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 4774
(Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 18.2-255.1 (Supp. 1980); MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT art. H
(Draft, Aug. 1979); Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289 (D. Del.
1980); Record Museum v. Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.J. 1979) (advertising
restrictions).
" See, e.g., High Ol' Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 449 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ga. 1978), rev'd and
remanded, 621 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1980), MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287A (d)(2) (Supp. 1980); VA.
CODE § 18.2-255.1 (Supp. 1980); MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT art. II (Draft, Aug. 1979).
See also Village of Hoffman Estates, Ill., Code § 8-7-16 (1978), cited in Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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prohibit the possession with intent to use or the use of materials that are
designed for manufacturing, processing, analyzing, or producing con-
trolled substances."
The varying breadth of these regulatory schemes and the inherent
difficulties in defining the generic terms "drug paraphernalia" and
"drug-related devices" raise fundamental questions regarding the
substantive and procedural sufficiency of many enactments." Resolution
of these questions requires that courts consider whether the challenged
legislation is vague and overbroad as violative of the due process
clause.'" A subsidiary issue is whether the advertising restrictions im-
permissibly chill the exercise of first amendment freedoms.19 Finally,
courts must assess whether the states' and the municipalities' efforts to
control the marketing of drug paraphernalia constitute a 16gitimate ex-
ercise of police powers."
Courts hold that the doctrine of due process requires clear definition
of proscribed conduct." Absent definitional clarity, an enactment is con-
" See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 4701(13) (Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287A (a)
(Supp. 1980); MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT art. I (Draft, Aug. 1979). Both the Model Act
(art. II) and the Maryland Code (§ 297(a)) include provisions that authorize civil forfeiture of
raw materials, products, and equipment used or intended for use in violation of the
statutory provisions. Maryland and Delaware both have adopted legislative versions pat-
terned after the Model Act.
' See notes 15-16 supra.
28 The fourteenth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o state shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States... :' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The due process clause forbids both procedural
and substantive statutory vagueness. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1948).
Procedural due process vagueness refers to statutory language that fails both to warn per-
sons potentially within its proscriptions and to provide proper standards for adjudication.
See Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 197 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Collings]. Substantive due process vagueness refers to language so
broad and sweeping in effect that it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct. See id.
" The first amendment provides, inter alia, that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. The fourteenth amendment
makes the provision applicable to the states. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811
(1975); note 18 supra.
"Although head shop retailers have alleged that paraphernalia enactments imper-
missibly burden interstate commerce, see Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F.
Supp. 289, 296 (D. Del. 1980), their arguments have failed to demonstrate cognizable
discrimination against interstate commerce and interference with declared congressional
policies. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,128-29 (1978). See generally
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Any effect on interstate commerce is incidental to a legitimate
government purpose. See id. at 124-29; see, e.g., Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
" E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939). See generally Aigler,
Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REV. 831 (1923); Freund, The Use of In-
definite Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437 (1921). The same principles of construction
should apply to due process analysis whether the enactment is state or municipal. Martin v.
King, 417 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1969).
1981]
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stitutionally void for vagueness.' Legislation must provide the person of
average intelligence with a reasonable opportunity to ascertain what
conduct is forbidden and an opportunity to act accordingly.' A statute or
ordinance, therefore, is impermissibly vague if it fails to provide fair
warning of proscribed behavior.24
A fundamental corollary to fair and explicit notice is the require-
ment that the statutory language minimize vulnerability to arbitrary
law enforcement.25 The proscriptive language of an enactment cannot be
so generalized and unfocused that its enforcement is tantamount to vin-
dication of police bias." Fair administration demands that a standard of
conduct not be susceptible to variable and situational definitions that
are tailored according to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement
personnel.'
In light of the requirements of the due process clause, much of the
language used in the paraphernalia statutes and ordinances is vague
within the meaning of the clause.28 Absent further definition to assist the
determination whether an item is drug paraphernalia, the terms "para-
phernalia" and "drug-related devices" are unconstitutionally vague and
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
Id. The rule or standard of legal compliance cannot be so vague as to provide no
discernible standard at all. A. B. Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 267 U.S. 233,
239 (1925); see Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975). One solution to the practical difficulties
of articulating a vagueness test that would accommodate various types of legislation is to
define vagueness in terms of a sliding scale. See Comment, ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility: Void for Vagueness?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 671, 675-76 (1979). Accordingly, the
degree of clarity and specificity constitutionally required of laws will increase as the poten-
tial sanction for their violation increases in severity. Id. at 675.
2 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). See generally Note, Due Process
Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 HARv. L. REV. 77 (1948); Note, Void for
Vagueness: An Escape From Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. L.J. 272 (1948).
1 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); see Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161-71 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614
(1971). Public dislike of particular groups may result in continuous and pervasive police
restraint on the activities of the focal groups. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98
(1940).
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 166-67 (1972). The vagrancy enact-
ments employ language which effectively illustrates the vagueness that the due process
clause forbids. These enactments, which lack necessary contextual guidelines, are plainly in-
definite and thereby invite discretionary enforcement. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 5Q7,
540 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Amsterdam,- Federal Constitutional Re~tric-
tions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of
Displeasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CaIM. L. BULL. 205, 218-40 (1967); notes 28 &
58 infra.
See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 n.9 (1974).
Compare VA. CODE §§ 18.2-248.2, 18.2-255.1 (Supp. 1980) (statutory language plainly
vague and fails to incorporate criteria regarding seller's intended purpose for device) with
DEL. CODE tit. 16, §§ 4701(13), 4771-4775 (Supp. 1980) (statutory language sufficiently clear
and definite to be fairly enforceable).
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incapable of fair enforcement.' Several courts reaching this conclusion
properly have nullified the offending enactments."
The construction of an enactment which has been attacked as uncon-
stitutionally vague necessarily imposes a difficult task upon the courts. 1
In assessing the validity of an enactment, courts must be conscious of
the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to a legislative act.2
Although the courts should defer to this presumption whenever possi-
ble," an enactment is void if its effect is to punish conduct not known to
be criminal. 4 A person acting in violation of statutory proscriptions can-
not claim insufficient warning or knowledge when the penalty is imposed
only for conduct perpetrated with the intent to disregard the terms of
the statute. 5 According to the terms of a statute, criminal liability re-
quires that the actor possess a conscious objective to cause the specific
consequences of his acts. 6 The determination of a specific purpose or
guilty state of mind, therefore, often requires analysis of attendant cir-
cumstances to ascertain whether an individual intends to conform his
conduct to that which is legally permissible. The scienter requirement
demanding that conduct must be wilful or purposeful mitigates the ob-
jection that an enactment punishes without warning an offense of which
the accused is unaware. 8
Absent a scienter requirement, a statute or ordinance is essentially
a trap for persons acting in good faith. 9 Those drug paraphernalia enact-
ments that include an intent element properly determine the merchant's
culpability according to the context in which he markets various
devices. 0 Accessories that patently are intended for illicit use qualify as
prohibited paraphernalia, and the seller should be held to possess the re-
2 See text accompanying note 21 supra; text accompanying notes 34-48 infra; note 62
infra. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
- See, e.g., Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F. Supp. 990 (D.N.J. 1980); High 01' Times, Inc. v.
Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978), affd, 621 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1980); see note 12
supra.
3' See Collings, supra note 18, at 198.
United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 92-93 (1921).
Id. at 92-93.
3 See Collings, supra note 18, at 198.
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945).
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 196, 198 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT].
I See id.; Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289, 291-93 (D. Del.
1980).
3 Screws v. United.States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945). As a general proposition, ignorance
of the law, whereby the accused is unaware of the existence of a statute proscribing his con-
duct, is no excuse from liability. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, § 47.
' United States v. Ragan, 314 U.S. 513, 524 (1942); see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S.
379, 401 (1979); United States v. Featherston, 461 F.2d 1119, 1121 (5th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972).
40 See.United States v. Brunett, 53 F.2d 219, 230-31 (W.D. Mo. 1931); note 62 infra.
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quisite scienter."1 Commercial distributors of drug paraphernalia,
therefore, are apprised of the forbidden conduct when the enactment re-
quires a determination whether an item is intended for use in conjunc-
tion with controlled substances.2
Analogous to the standard requiring the merchant to intend an item
for a particular unlawful purpose, the actual and constructive knowledge
standards43 are consistent with the due process protections of fair notice
and enforcement." No constitutional detriment accrues to a person ac-
cused of violating the law when he acts with knowledge that specific con-
sequences are substantially certain to result from his conduct. 5 Accord-
ingly, criminal liability may attach when the seller who legitimately mer-
chandises items with only potential drug-related use is aware of cir-
cumstances that should cause him reasonably to believe that a potential
purchaser intends to use an item illicitly.' The legitimate merchant,
" See Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289, 292-93 (D. Del.
1980).
4 See id. at 3-10; Hogan v. Atkins, 411 F.2d 576, 577-78 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam);
Millet, Pit and Seed Co., Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 84, 89 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); cf.
Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (conviction for failure to register as felon void ab-
sent knowledge of affirmative duty).
I Those statutes which are patterned after the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act impose
a knowledge standard on the seller regarding the buyer's intent to use a particular item for
drug-related purposes. See MD. ANN. CODE. art. 27, § 287 A (d) (Supp. 1980) ("[ilt is unlawful
for any person to deliver or sell, possess with intent to deliver or sell .... knowing, or under
circumstances where one reasonably should know .. "). Although knowledge encompasses
less than absolute certainty, United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976), no one may avoid knowledge simply by ignoring facts which
should prompt investigation. United States v. Brown, 328 F. Supp. 196, 198 n.2 (E.D. Va.
1971). A seller may not be held criminally liable for an inadvertent misjudgment of the pur-
chaser's contemplated use. See Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289,
294 (D. Del. 1980); Music Stop, Inc. v. City of Ferndale, 488 F. Supp. 390, 393 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Knoedler v. Roxbury Township, 485 F. Supp. 990, 993 (D.N.J. 1980); notes 39-40 supra.
" Federal and state legislatures repeatedly and successfully have employed the ele-
ment of constructive knowledge in various enactments. Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v.
Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. Del. 1980).
'3 LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 36, § 28, at 196.
,3 Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. Del. 1980).
Statutory provisions which incorporate knowledge or constructive knowledge of the pur-
chaser's intended use apply only to the merchant who sells drug paraphernalia, and not to
the purchaser. See id. at 292-93. Head shop owners have argued that restrictions on the
marketing of drug paraphernalia unconstitutionally interfere with the privacy rights of
potential purchasers. See id. at 295; ef. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (statute
criminalizing mere private possession of obscene materials held unconstitutional). These
arguments are without merit, however, because those enactments which are otherwise con-
stitutional do not attempt to criminalize private possession of drug-related devices without
proof of the person's intended use. See notes 4, 14-15 supra. Thus, the fundamental right to
privacy is inapplicable in the context of these enactments. See 394 U.S. at 568 & n.11. See
also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). In the absence of a cognizable first amendment
claim, merchants also lack standing to assert the rights of third party purchasers who are
not before the courts. See Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. at 295-96;
note 63 infra.
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however, should not be held culpable if he does not know the buyer's
purpose and if objective facts do not fairly warn him that unlawful use is
likely to ensue.47 Drug paraphernalia enactments that permit proof of
constructive knowledge as a substitute for actual knowledge of the pur-
chaser's intended use, therefore, do not violate due process. 8
The fundamental guarantees of due process, however, constitute only
a rough idea of fairness.'9 Due process principles should not elevate to
constitutional dimensions the tenuous balance between the practicalities
of drafting legislation to accommodate a variety of circumstances and
the requirement that proscribed conduct be delineated fairly.50 Not-
withstanding nominal differences in estimates of what conduct is
statutorily prohibited," a statute is constitutional provided the language
or the subject matter comprehends an enforceable standard.52 Statutes
and ordinances should not be held void for vagueness simply because of
difficulty in ascertaining whether marginal behavior is proscribed.5' Ab-
solute precision in statutory language is neither constitutionally man-
dated nor practically possible.5 A legislative measure may not be so
vague, however, that persons potentially affected must guess at the
meaning of the language. '
Statutory language that employs operative words and expressions
having common, ordinary meanings' is consistent with due process so
long as the statute provides additional textual guidance.17 Paraphernalia
" Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. Del. 1980).
" Id. at 295; see Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27 (1941).
" Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
£0Id.
, See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-78 (1913).
" United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 92 (1921).
United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963); see United States
v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 (1954); United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 399 (1930).
" Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)
International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223-24 (1914). The vagueness
doctrine demands that statutes and ordinances possibly concerning first amendment expres-
sion have precise definition. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). A lesser degree of
specificity is permitted, for example, in legislation that entails purely economic regulation.
Id. at 573 n.10. This distinction can be attributed to the narrow range of activities subject to
economic restraints. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
1 Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. 400,
406-07 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). The use of
familiar terms such as bongs, water pipes, and roach clips narrows the intended focus of the
paraphernalia enactments. See note 5 supra. Without more precise definition, however,
these terms are not sufficiently clear. See text accompanying notes 34-48 supra.
, See Geiger v. City of Eagan, 618 F.2d 26, 29 (8th Cir. 1980); Record Museum v.
Lawrence Township, 481 F. Supp. 768, 773 (D.N.J. 1979) . As part of their enforcement of
the Lawrence Township paraphernalia ordinance, local police investigated only head shops
and failed to ascertain whether other retail establishments were marketing drug-related
devices in violation of the ordinance. 481 F. Supp. at 773. The district court held the or-
dinance unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Id. at 775; cf. Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) ("common night walkers," "loafing," "wandering," and
"strolling" impermissibly vague); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453-57 (1939)
("gang" impermissibly vague).
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enactments that do not employ exclusionary criteria for accessories not
specifically designed for illicit use, therefore, fail to describe the forbid-
den items with requisite clarity and invite arbitrary enforcement
policies. 8 Without these criteria, merchants must make ad hoc deter-
minations whether a particular item qualifies as drug paraphernalia. 9
Rather than imposing absolute bans on the marketing of items that
arguably could be drug paraphernalia, these laws should define drug-
related devices according to the context of their advertised and intended
use." Utilizing this approach, legislatures avoid the constitutional diffi-
culties of banning the sale of devices for which there are also innocent
uses." Specific statutory criteria would protect the continued sale of
items not contemplated for drug-related purposes.62
Although an enactment fairly warns those persons to whom it may
apply, a precise standard of conduct may be overbroad if constitutionally
protected conduct falls within the purview of the enactment.6 3 A statute
or ordinance, therefore, must be struck down if, within its definable am-
bit, the enactment impermissibly intrudes upon protected first amend-
ment expression. 4 Restrictions on first amendment expression may not
" See note 57 supra.
" See VA. CODE § 18.2-248.2 (Supp. 1980); notes 60 & 62 infra.
'o See Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289, 291-93 (D. Del.
1980); notes 57-59 supra; note 62 infra.
"l Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. 400, 403
(N.D. Ill. 1980). Devices having innocent or beneficial uses include cigarette papers, tobacco
pipes, syringes, hypodermic needles, spoons, and eye droppers.
" Appropriate criteria that courts should consider in determining an item's intended
purpose include whether the alleged violator is a licensed distributor of tobacco products,
expert testimony regarding the item's principle use, direct or circumstantial evidence con-
cerning the general business context, oral or written instructions describing an item's use,
and national and local advertising schemes. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 287A (b) (Supp.
1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-04(3) (Supp. 1979); cf McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
428 (1961) (ordinary commercial knowledge or reasonable investigation would sufficiently
define retail sales exemptions codified in Sunday closings law).
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972). A party's standing to allege
that an enactment abridges his first amendment right to free expression does not depend on
whether his own conduct is constitutionally privileged. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809,
815 (1975). Courts recognize this exception to the usual rules governing standing, id.,
because of the assumption that the statute's existence may cause persons not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or conduct. Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); see Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965).
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1972); see Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961). Pro-
tected first amendment speech generally encompasses "political" expression. Jackson & Jef-
fries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L.
REV. 1, 10 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Jackson & Jeffries]. At a minimum, the first amend-
ment safeguards the process of shaping the will of the popular majority and effectuating
that will through elected government representatives. Id. Political speech also includes the
exchange of ideas and information that foster the development of political opinion. Id. Fur-
thermore, the opportunity for individual development and self-fulfillment manifests the
ascribed value of each person's right to form and express his own convictions and opinions.
[d. at 12.
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couch or expand their intended effect in the guise of permissible regula-
tion. 5
Expressions of politically, socially, or religiously significant ideas
are entitled to virtually absolute first amendment protection."6 Purely
commercial speech, 17 however, is not intended to convey messages of
clear public interest. 8 Accordingly, pure commercial expression receives
only a subordinate and limited amount of first amendment protection
commensurate with the state interest in regulating the underlying com-
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117 (1972).
See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95-96 (1940); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note
64, at 9-14.
" Although never clearly defined, commercial speech refers to business advertising
that does no more than solicit a commercial transaction and state factual information rele-
vant thereto. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 64, at 1. Commercial speech, by definition, does
not comprehend expression necessary to the ideals of self-government. Id at 15. The first
amendment preserves the dichotomy between political speech and commercial speech, and
distinguishes the market for ideas from the market for goods and services. Id. at 2. Embrac-
ing this distinction, the first amendment imposes stringent protections against government
restraint of ideas. See id The origin of the commercial speech exception to privileged
speech is traceable to Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Although the advertiser
in Valentine appended a protest against the ordinance to commercial handbills, the Court
stated that the message attemptedto evade the terms of the ordinance and, therefore, did
not constitute protected expression. Id. at 53-55. Sustaining the ordinance, the Court con-
cluded that the first amendment does not limit government regulation of purely commercial
advertising. Id at 54. Subsequent decisions, however, clearly have rejected a broad con-
struction of Valentine that would insulate statutes regulating commercial speech from first
amendment challenges. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 819-20 & n.6 (1975); cf. Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (statute prohibiting door-to-door distribution of
religious leaflets violative of first amendment protection of religion).
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821-22 (1975); Jackson & Jeffries, supra note
64, at 1-2. In Bigelow, the Court held that an advertisement publicizing the availability of
out-of-state abortions was entitled to first amendment protection. 421 U.S. at 825. Although
the Court stated that the advertisement proposed a commercial transaction, the Court
characterized the commercial content as information of clear public interest. Id. at 822.
Since the abortion services were legalized in New York and not in Virginia, the Court
reasoned that the advertisement was a protected means of encouraging reform of Virginia's
abortion laws and of conveying general information to interested parties. Id These adver-
tisements, however, should be distinguished from drug paraphernalia advertisements.
Unlike the substances for which drug-related devices are designed, abortion services are
not subject to blanket prohibitions. Accordingly, state and local governments may regulate
those advertisements that propose a sale of controlled substances, which is clearly an illegal
transaction. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rel., 413 U.S. 376, 388
(1973). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Sales and advertising of parapher-
nalia intended for illicit use, therefore, suggest and impliedly sanction unlawful commercial
activity and should be subject to governmental regulation. See 413 U.S. at 389; note 62
supra; note 70 infra. The advertisement litigated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), effectively illustrates the distinction between commercial and pure speech.
The advertisement in Sullivan protested police actions against participants in a civil rights.
movement, expressed political grievances, and solicited financial support for a civil rights
movement. Id. at 256-57. The purpose of the advertisement plainly was not to propose a
commercial transaction. Id. at 266. Speech does not forfeit first amendment protection mere-
ly because money is spent to project it in the form of a paid advertisement. Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
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mercial transaction. 9 Although legislatures may not regulate commer-
cial expression solely because of their power to regulate commerce,
when the expression proposes a commercial transaction which is itself
statutorily prohibited, legislatures then may regulate the expression
which proposes that transaction.7"
A paramount governmental policy that does not seek to suppress
free expression on the basis of content alone, therefore, will justify
limitations which incidentally affect first amendment freedoms.71 To the
degree that state and local governments may restrict commercial activ-
ity, the relationship of speech to the activity is one factor for courts to
consider when weighing the first amendment interest against a rational
government purpose.72 States and municipalities do not relinquish their
power to regulate commercial activity considered harmful to the com-
munity whenever speech, whether printed or spoken, is a component of
that conduct. Accordingly, the commercial content of drug parapher-
nalia advertisements should not benefit from an absolute first amend-
" Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); see note 71 infra. In
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976),
the Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that precluded a licensed pharmacist from
advertising prescription drug prices. Id. at 749-50, 770. The Court in Virginia Bd of Phar-
macy emphasized the statute's interference with the basic values of economic liberty and
the absence of a significant government interest in regulating this particular professional
conduct. See Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 64, at 25, 29. Nevertheless, the Court ultimately
glossed over the advertiser's purely economic interests and failed to explain why this adver-
tising was entitled to constitutional protection. See id. Although the value of lower pre-
scription prices and consumer choice is undisputable, the Court seemingly reconstituted
economic due process as a component of the freedom of speech. Id. at 29-31, 4041.
7 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rel., 413 U.S. 376, 389
(1973). In Pittsburgh Press Co., the Court upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance that a
state court had construed to preclude newspapers from printing advertisements for non-
exempt employment opportunities in sex-designated columns. Id. at 391. The Court observed
that discrimination in employment is illegal commercial activity under the terms of the or-
dinance. Id- at 388. Accordingly, these employment advertisements are classic examples of
commercial speech. Id at 385. A typical business advertisement that only solicits a commer-
cial transaction serves no valid purpose when the predicate transaction is prohibited by law.
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 64, at 34.
' United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375-77, 380-82 (1968); see Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62-68, 71-72 (1976). Compare Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (restraint on advertising of availability and terms of routine legal services
held violative of first amendment) with Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (restrictions
on advertising of trade name held not violative of first amendment). Mere public intolerance
or disapproval of particular commercial advertising is insufficient to deprive that speech of
an appropriate measure of constitutional protection. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 701 (1977); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
72 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); see Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 64,
at 7. Courts have held consistently that states may impose reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restrictions on protected expression. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770-71 (1976); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312
U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941); note 84 infra.
11 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
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ment privilege. 4 The apparent ,focus of these advertisements is to
enhance the commercial appeal of drug-related devices, and not to con-
vey political, social, or religious ideas."5
Government restraint on both the commercial sales and advertising
of drug paraphernalia is appropriate when the government demon-
strates a significant and legitimate interest in the curtailment of ac-
tivities which detrimentally affect the well-being of the community. '
The governmental police authority embraces the duty to protect the
safety, health, good order, and morals of the community." Governments
may exercise their recognized police powers to the extent that the
chosen methods comport with due process." The due process clause re-
quires only that the law not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious
and that the selected means of enforcement will have a real and substan-
tial relation to the legislature's intended policy. 9
Subject only to due process constraints, state and local governments
possess the fundamental power to enact police regulations in the public
interest that may interfere with the full enjoyment of private rights."0
State and municipal authority to protect the public welfare encompasses
the assumption that legislatures may act to regulate even bona fide
business practices.8 ' Despite their police authority, legislatures may not
impose restrictions or financial burdens beyond the scope of a rationally
based public purpose.82 A rational basis, however, does not require ab-
solute certainty that the enactment will accomplish its intended pur-
pose." Nevertheless, bare assertions that the burden is related to a par-
ticular policy objective are insufficient to warrant imposition of regula-
tions.'
" Arguably, commercial speech should not benefit from judicial scrutiny under the
aegis of the first amendment and should remain within the domain of legislative authority.
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 64, at 5. Measured in terms of traditional first amendment
values, see id. at 10, commercial speech is remarkably devoid of significance. Id. at 10, 14.
Restrictions on commercial speech, therefore, should not be subject to judicial abrogation
that is premised on first amendment analysis. Id. at 7.
,1 See Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1206 (4th Cir. 1980); text accompanying
notes 66-71 supra.
78 See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1978).
" California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 324 (1905).
,' Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
79 Id.
Id. at 523.
" Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632 (1951). The Court in Breard held that an or-
dinance prohibiting otherwise lawful business solicitation rationally pursued the city's in-
terest in minimizing the annoyances incident to door-to-door canvassing. Id. at 624-27.
Regulations, which in effect substitute the judgment of the community for the judgment of
the individual, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943), necessarily entail cer-
tain financial burdens. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1952); see
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 304-05 (1976) (per curiam).
See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 (1977).
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
4 Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 696 (1977).
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When reasonable bases for government action exist, the state may
act at its discretion to select the means adapted to a particular purpose."
Courts must accept the conclusions manifested in the statutes and or-
dinances unless these conclusions are repugnant to the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.86 The courts, therefore, should not
sit as superlegislatures to evaluate the wisdom of the underlying policies
of legislation. 7 State and local legislatures are free to experiment with
new techniques and to adopt their own standards of the public welfare."
Pursuant to a demonstrable public purpose, the drug paraphernalia
enactments constitute valid restraints on the flourishing commerce in
drug paraphernalia.89 The legitimate public interest in controlling drug
use warrants a scheme of legislative constraints which makes no age
distinction among potential purchasers of drug-related devices." Enact-
ments that forbid commercial sales and distribution of accessories
designed or intended for use with controlled substances, therefore, pro-
mote declared drug enforcement policies." These legislative measures
bear a real and substantial relationship to the expressed objective of
controlling the use of substances which are physically harmful and
patently illegal. 2
Similarly, state and local authorities may impose restrictions on the
commercial advertising of drug paraphernalia so long as these restric-
tions also reveal a substantial and bona fide relationship to the public in-
terest.3 Restraints on advertising that suggests drug-related use for
particular devices do not impose arbitrary burdens.94 Absolute first
amendment protection of commercial speech under these circumstances
would interfere impermissibly with the legitimate government interest
in proscribing activities which threaten the physical and moral health of
California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 321 (1905).
o Id.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
Id. In at least one case, merchants argued that the challenged paraphernalia statute
was not a comprehensive means to further the state's interest in controlling drug abuse.
See Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289, 295 (D. Del. 1980). These
arguments are without merit, however, because a legislature may adopt a gradual approach
and deal with one aspect of a problem without simultaneously addressing the entire pro-
blem. Id.; see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 215 (1975).
89 See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-04 (Supp. 1979); note 82 supra; text accompanying
notes 71-81 supra.
9" See, e.g., Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 89, 94-95 (1969); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962); Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
92 See text accompanying notes 6-10, 71-84 supra; cf. In re Leroy T., 285 Md. 508, 403
A.2d 1226 (1979) (ordinance banning possession of certain articles for purpose of committing
criminal offense violated due process); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 22-3601 (West) (1973) (posses-
sion of implements of crime).
See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
" See note 78 supra.
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the community. 5 The resultant constraints on the speech element of the
paraphernalia advertisements are incidental to the intended effect of
furthering the policy interest in controlling sales of drug paraphernalia."
The intended effect of the paraphernalia enactments, however, will
not justify a complete ban on all advertising strategies that merchants
may employ to increase the marketability of drug-related accessories. 7
Absent the suggestive context of drug-related use,9 8 restraints on the
advertising of paraphernalia having potential lawful utility may pre-
clude the dissemination of constitutionally protected information.
Advertising restrictions that incorporate specific statutory criteria do
not abridge first amendment freedoms when the commercial message
designedly proposes the sale of forbidden drug paraphernalia. '
Notwithstanding the validity of the states' interest in regulating
commercial sales and advertising of drug paraphernalia, the states'
special interest in their juvenile population warrants additional
legislative controls." A more rigorous government intrusion reflects the
determination that juveniles, because they have not attained an in-
formed and independent age, require greater protection from the harm-
ful effects of controlled substances than do adults."2 To combat the
paradox' 3 that the paraphernalia industry has created, state and local
governments have acted consistently with due process guarantees in
order to protect juveniles during the years of their presumed legal in-
capacity." ' Acknowledging this age distinction, the legislatures reason-
0" See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-64 (1973); text accompanying
notes 71-84 supra.
See notes 71 & 81 supra.
See notes 70, 72 & 96 supra.
" In Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966), the Court held that certain
materials were obscene, based substantially on the sexually provocative context within
which the publishers distributed the materials. Id. at 472. The Court in Ginzburg emphasized
the publishers' deliberate appeals to the salaciously disposed. Id.; accord, United States v.
Rebhuhn, 109 F.2d 512, 514-15 (2d Cir. 19401. Pandering and suggestive advertising lack a
bona fide intention to exercise a constitutional right and, therefore, are not entitled to ab-
solute first amendment protection. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 111 (1972); note 68
supra.
" See note 98 supra.
10 See note 62 supra; text accompanying notes 34-48 supra; cf. High 01' Times, Inc. v.
Busbee, 456 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (statute proscribing sale or display of drug-
related literature to minors held unconstitutional); MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT art.
II, Comments (Draft, Aug. 1979) (drug-related printed materials not subject to advertising
restrictions).
,' Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 485 F. Supp. 400, 409
(N.D. Ill. 1980); see Paris v. Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-41 (1968). An example of additional government restraint
regarding sales to minors is found in the Maryland Code, which imposes an increased penalty
upon a seller's conviction for delivering drug paraphernalia to a juvenile. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 287A (d)(2) (Supp. 1980).
See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 n.11 (1975).
, See text accompanying notes 6-9 supra.
10, See notes 101-102 supra.
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ably have concluded that the paraphernalia industry poses a real and
substantial threat to the well-being of juveniles."5
Legislation that proscribes sales and advertising of drug parapher-
nalia, both to adults and to minors, can be drafted in accordance with the
fundamental privileges of free speech and due process of law. Un-
doubtedly, these measures will cause head shops to change current
retail practices significantly and will produce marked financial losses
throughout the paraphernalia industry. Since the burgeoning rate of
drug use and abuse is unlikely to abate, legislative attempts to deter
commerce in drug-related devices should become increasingly attractive
to state and local governments." 6
SALLY FITE STANFIELD
101 See Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1205-06 (4th Cir. 1980).
I0 The Model Drug Paraphernalia Act or other similar legislation represents one
viable and constitutionally permissible regulatory scheme. The Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration drafted the Model Act at the request of state authorities to enable state and
local governments to deal more effectively with the highly successful paraphernalia in-
dustry. MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT, Prefatory Note (Draft, Aug. 1979). At least two
federal courts have held constitutional state legislative versions that are patterned after
the Model Act. See, e.g., Mid-Atlantic Access. Trade Ass'n v. Maryland, No. H-80-1343 (D.
Md. Nov. 12, 1980); Delaware Access. Trade Ass'n v. Gebelein, 497 F. Supp. 289 (D. Del.
1980). But see Record Revolution No. 6, Inc. v. City of Parma, No. 80-3308 (6th Cir. Dec. 8,
1980).
